2020 IEEE INFORMATION THEORY WORKSHOP

IEEE ITW 2020

  • ABSTRACT

We investigate a strategic formulation of the joint source-channel coding problem in which the encoder and the decoder are endowed with distinct distortion functions. We provide the solutions in four different scenarios. First, we assume that the encoder and the decoder cooperate in order to achieve a certain pair of distortion values. Second, we suppose that the encoder commits to a strategy whereas the decoder implements a best response, as in the persuasion game where the encoder is the Stackelberg leader. Third, we consider that the decoder commits to a strategy, as in the mismatched rate-distortion problem or as in the mechanism design framework. Fourth, we study the cheap talk game in which the encoding and the decoding strategies form a Nash equilibrium.

  • PRESENTER

Maël Le Treust
  CNRS ETIS, Cergy, France

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